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SHUT THE BLINDS AND LOCK THE DOORS-IS THAT
ENOUGH?: THE SCOPE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTION OUTSIDE ONE'S OWN HOME
Ramsey Ramerman
Abstract: The Fourth Amendment was designed to be a barrier that protects citizens from
unreasonable government intrusion and surveillance. However, for the Amendment to grant
meaningful protection, the rules that govern the scope of that protection must supply guidance
to police and citizens. While the Fourth Amendment unquestionably protects people in their
own homes, the scope of the Amendment's protection outside the home is not clear. In Rakas
v. Illinois, the U.S. Supreme Court held that courts should define the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection by considering sources outside of the Fourth Amendment. While
Rakas provides guidance to courts, it does not provide guidance to police and citizens.
Minnesota v. Carter exemplifies this problem. In Carter, the Court relied on three of the
sources identified in Rakas to develop a test to define the scope of privacy for guests and
applied this test to hold that short-term business guests should not expect privacy, no matter
what precautions they take to ensure their privacy. Police, however, will find the Court's test
impossible to apply in the field, and if they try to apply it, a great risk exists that they will
violate citizens' Fourth Amendment rights. This Comment urges the Court to adopt a test that
first focuses on the precautions people take to ensure their privacy and then asks whether a
reasonable person would find that those precautions should have been adequate to ensure
privacy. This test would better protect privacy because it would provide clear guidance to
both police and citizens.
Using marked currency, an officer conducting an undercover drug
bust purchased two bags of cocaine from Lloyd Morton.' After the sale, a
second officer saw Morton enter a row house less than two blocks away.
Within five minutes, police knocked on the door of the house and entered
without waiting for permission. They saw Morton in the kitchen, arrested
him, searched him, and brought him outside where the purchasing officer
identified Morton as the seller. The search yielded only unmarked
currency.
Morton claimed that the officers' entry into the house violated his
Fourth Amendment rights and moved to suppress the unmarked currency
as fruits of that illegal entry. At the suppression hearing, Morton
established that although he did not live at the house, he frequently
visited as a family friend and was an invited guest the day of his arrest.
The trial court denied Morton's motion because under the Fourth
Amendment, Morton was "no more than a ... visitor to the dwelling"
1. The following facts are taken from Morton v. United States, 734 A.2d 178 (D.C. 1999).
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and should not have expected privacy.2 A divided appeals court reversed.
The two-judge majority held that Morton's status as an invited guest who
visited with "the regularity of a family member" meant that he had
achieved a sufficient degree of acceptance in the household and could
reasonably expect privacy there.3 The dissenting judge argued that
Morton's visit to drop off the profits of a drug sale should not warrant
Fourth Amendment protection.4 Neither the majority nor the dissent
explained how police could have assessed Morton's relationship with his
host or his reasons for visiting before police entered the house.
The Morton court focused its debate on the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision in Minnesota v. Carter,5 which held that short-term business
guests should not expect privacy in their host's home.6 The Carter
majority reached this conclusion by developing a balancing test to
determine when people have reasonable expectations of privacy outside
their homes.7 At one end of the spectrum are overnight guests who can
reasonably expect privacy in their host's home.' At the other end are
people legitimately on the premises without any further connection to
those premises, such as a delivery person, who should not expect
privacy.9 To determine whether guests should expect privacy when they
are not spending the night but do have some connection to the premises,
the Court held that lower courts should consider the guests' use of the
premises, their relationship to the host, and the length of their stay.' The
Court developed this test by following Rakas v. Illinois," in which it held
that the scope of Fourth Amendment protection "must have a source
outside of the Fourth Amendment.' '12 The Rakas majority and Justice
Powell, who concurred, identified five such sources-the Rakas
sources. 3 In Carter, the Court considered three of the Rakas sources:
2. Id. at 185 (Kern, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 182. The government requested that the court not consider whether exigent circumstances
justified the search. See id. at 179.
4. See id. at 188 (Kern, J., dissenting).
5. 525 U.S. 83 (1998).
6. See id. at91.
7. See id. at 90-91.
8. See id. at 89.
9. See id. 89-90.
10. See id. at91.
11. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
12. Id. at 143 n.12.
13. See infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text for a complete list of the Rakas sources.
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property interest in the premises, use of the premises, and societal
understandings. 4 The Carter Court did not address another Rakas
source, namely the precautions people take to ensure privacy. By
ignoring this source, the Court's ruling implicitly makes the precautions
short-term business guests take to ensure privacy irrelevant because even
if the defendants in Carter had taken every precaution possible, the Court
still would not have had to address the defendants' precautions.
This Comment argues that the Carter test and the Rakas sources
provide insufficient guidance to police and private citizens and thus fail
to protect Fourth Amendment rights. Police cannot apply the Carter test
or use the Rakas sources because officers in the field have little ability to
obtain the necessary information. Citizens cannot rely on the Carter test
or Rakas sources because those standards are confusing and do not rely
on factors that citizens would expect to protect privacy. When assessing
people's privacy expectations, courts instead should look exclusively at
the precautions people take to ensure privacy and then ask whether a
reasonable person would conclude that those precautions should have
ensured privacy. Such a test would better protect Fourth Amendment
rights because it would provide guidance to police investigating crimes
and citizens seeking to exercise their Fourth Amendment rights.
Part I of this Comment describes the rules the U.S. Supreme Court has
developed to enforce the Fourth Amendment, including the sources
identified in Rakas v. Illinois, which the Court has used to determine the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection outside the home. Part II
describes the facts of Minnesota v. Carter and the Court's application of
the Rakas sources in that case. Part III criticizes the Rakas sources and
the Court's application of those sources in Carter and proposes an
alternative test that better protects Fourth Amendment rights.
14. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 88, 91.
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I. REASONABLE EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY OUTSIDE THE
HOME: THE FIVE RAKAS SOURCES
The Fourth Amendment' 5 was designed to protect citizens from
unreasonable police intrusion. To ensure that the government respects
citizens' Fourth Amendment rights, courts exclude evidence from trial
that is gathered in violation of those rights. However, excluding evidence
from trial exacts a high social cost, and therefore courts will exclude
evidence only from the trials of people whose own rights were violated.
To determine when someone has a Fourth Amendment right outside of
the home, courts look to sources outside of the Fourth Amendment-the
Rakas sources.
A. The Court Enforces Fourth Amendment Rights Through Fourth
Amendment Tests and the Exclusionary Rule
While the Fourth Amendment's language expressly condemns all
unreasonable searches and seizures, the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized that the Amendment serves the broader purpose of protecting
a person's right to live in reasonable security, free from government
intrusion or surveillance.' 6 However, the Fourth Amendment does not
provide total freedom from government intrusion. The Amendment's
prohibition against only "unreasonable searches and seizures" means that
courts must strike a balance between the duty of the government to
secure an orderly society and the risk that unreasonable surveillance will
erode people's expectations of privacy. 7 When police are conducting a
search during a criminal investigation, courts generally require that they
have probable cause and obtain a search warrant before they conduct the
search. 8 Probable cause exists when the known facts and circumstances
15. The Fourth Amendment states:
The rights of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. Const. amend. IV.
16. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-86 & n.24 (1980).
17. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-15 (1972).
18. See Vemonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995). If the government is conducting a
search for non-law-enforcement purposes, different rules apply. See id. The Court has also
recognized a number of exceptions to the warrant requirement. Some of these exceptions, such as the
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would cause a reasonable person to believe a search will reveal evidence
of a crime. 9
1. A Fourth Amendment Test Must Be Easy for Police and Citizens to
Apply
For the Fourth Amendment to serve its purpose of protecting privacy,
the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly noted "the virtue of providing
clear and unequivocal guidelines to the law enforcement profession."2 °
To provide guidance for police, the Court has held that it should develop
a doctrine that relies on familiar standards easily applied by police in the
performance of their duties.2' The Court has found that highly
sophisticated rules relying on minute distinctions will be "literally
impossible" for officers to apply.' While striving to provide guidance, at
times the Court has rejected complex tests containing "a highly
sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and
buts... [that require] the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline
distinctions ' 'u because such tests are too difficult for police to apply and
allow for unequal and arbitrary enforcement.24
car exception and the heavily-regulated-business exception, stem from the Rakas sources and are
discussed below. See infra notes 55, 57-59, and accompanying text. Other exceptions stem from
concerns such as officer and civilian safety, and a discussion of those exceptions is beyond the scope
of this Comment. Justice Scalia and some commentators have suggested that the long list of
exceptions to the warrant requirement has vitiated that requirement. See California v. Acevedo, 500
U.S. 565, 582-83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (listing over 20 recognized exceptions to warrant
requirement); John M. Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of the Protection,
79 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1105, 1108-10 (1989) (suggesting that rather than relying on warrant
requirement as default rule, Court first determines what "predicate" is required for search, only one
of which is probable cause and warrant). However, because this Comment is concerned with
situations when a court is determining whether a person can even object to a search, the debate of
whether the exceptions to the warrant requirement has consumed the rule is also beyond the scope of
this Comment.
19. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996).
20. California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 577 (1991) (citing Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146,
151 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 682 (1988)) (internal quotations omitted); see also
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,458 (198 1).
21. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 458.
22. Id (internal quotations omitted); see also Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 772-73 (1983).
23. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984) (internal quotations omitted); see also
Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96 (1990) (rejecting Minnesota's proposed 12-part test to
determine if dwelling qualifies as home).
24. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 181.
285
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At the same time, citizens should know when the Fourth Amendment
protects their activities. Thus, the Court has held that "[w]herever a man
may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.,, 25 A workable standard also protects citizens by
reducing the risk that police will erroneously violate citizens' Fourth
Amendment rights.26
2. The Exclusionary Rule
If police conduct a warrantless search when circumstances require a
warrant, that search violates the Fourth Amendment and is illegal.27 To give
citizens recourse, the Court developed the exclusionary rule,28 which
excludes from admission at trial evidence that was gathered in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, even if the evidence is relevant and reliable.29 The
Court limited the high social cost of excluding this relevant evidence by
holding that Fourth Amendment rights are personal and only those people
whose own rights were violated may invoke the exclusionary rule.30
While this limit on the exclusionary rule does not cause much confusion
about the scope of Fourth Amendment protection when the contested search
was of a person's own home,3 the limit does create problems identifying
the scope of protection outside the home. Originally, the Court used the
doctrine of standing to enforce the personal nature of the Amendment's
32protection. To have standing, criminal defendants had to prove that an
illegal search caused them an "injury in fact" and that they were asserting
their own rights, not someone else's.3 Defendants who merely established
that admission of illegally obtained evidence would prejudice them at trial,
but could not establish that their own Fourth Amendment rights had been
violated, did not have standing.34
25. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967); see also Belton, 453 U.S. at 459-60.
26. See Andreas, 463 U.S. at 773.
27. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990).
28. See id.
29. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984); see also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
137 (1978).
30. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-34.
31. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980).
32. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 138. The standing doctrine and the Rakas sources apply to searches of
the home as well.
33. See id. at 139.
34. See id. at 134.
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B. Rakas and the Sources That Define the Scope ofFourth Amendment
Protection
In Rakas, the Court abandoned standing because it recognized that,
after Katz v. United States," the existing Fourth Amendment doctrine
allowed only people with reasonable expectations of privacy to benefit
from the exclusionary rule, and thus the existing doctrine assured that
people could successfully assert only their own rights.36 This made the
task of analyzing standing at a suppression hearing redundant.37 The
Court instead held that trial courts should apply the test developed in
Katz,38 which requires a court to make two determinations: "[F]irst[,] that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and,
second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable."39
The Rakas Court identified reasonable expectations of privacy as the
key factor in the Katz test.' ° To determine reasonable expectations of
privacy, the Rakas Court instructed that lower courts must look to
sources outside of the Fourth Amendment.41 These sources are (1)
property interests,42 (2) the way people use a location,43 (3) societal
understandings,' (4) the intent of the Framers,45 and (5) people's
precautions to ensure privacy.' If people do not have a reasonable
expectation of privacy, police action-however egregious-will not
violate their Fourth Amendment rights.47
35. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
36. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133.
37. See iL
38. See id. at 143 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
39. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal quotation omitted).
40. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12. For clarity and to distinguish between this question and the
separate societal-understandings source, see infra notes 66-75 and accompanying text, this
Comment will phrase this key factor as "reasonable expectations of privacy" rather than
.expectations of privacy society is prepared to recognize as reasonable."
41. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143 n.12.
42. See id. at 152-53 (Powell, J., concurring).
43. See id. (Powell, J., concurring).
44. See id. at 143 n.12.
45. See id. at 152-53 (Powell, J., concurring).
46. See id. (Powell, J., concurring).
47. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980) ("[T]he interest in deterring illegal
searches does not justify the exclusion of tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was not the
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In Rakas, the Court held that police did not violate defendant Rakas's
Fourth Amendment rights when they searched a car in which he was a
backseat passenger because Rakas did not assert he had a property
interest in the car and because he had no legitimate interest in the area
searched-the glove compartment and under the passenger-side front
seat.4" Because Rakas was not entitled to expect privacy in the car, the
Court held that it was not necessary to determine if the search violated
someone else's Fourth Amendment rights.49 Since Rakas the Court has
repeatedly relied on one or more of the Rakas sources to define the scope
of Fourth Amendment protection.
1. Property Interests
The first Rakas source is people's property interests in the location
searched." While property interests grant the most protection to people
in their homes, property interests in other enclosed locations5 also grant
broad protection. Rakas developed this source by relying in part on
Alderman v. United States, 2 where the Court held that police recording
conversations at a business would violate the business owner's Fourth
Amendment right even if the owner was not present during the
recording. 3 More recently, the Court left open the possibility that car
owners might have a sufficient expectation of privacy in their car so that
the Fourth Amendment may protect their interests in that car even if
someone else borrows it.54
victim of the challenged practices."). For a discussion of Payner, see infra notes 124-29 and
accompanying text.
48. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148.
49. Seeid. at 150.
50. Ownership is not required before people can reasonably expect privacy in a location. See
Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 367 (1968).
51. In contrast, an open field will not warrant Fourth Amendment protection. See Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 183-84 (1984).
52. 394 U.S. 165 (1967).
53. See id. at 176.
54. See United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77, 82 (1993) (holding that membership in conspiracy will
not automatically give any member reasonable expectation of privacy in car, but remanding to district
court to determine if ownership of car would be sufficient). On remand, the district court found that the
owners' rights were violated. See United States v. Padilla, 111 F.3d 685, 686 n. I (1997).
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2. The Way a Person Uses a Location
The way people use a location will often be a source for defining the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection in that location. The Fourth
Amendment protects the home and its surrounding curtilage because
people use such locations for intimate activities associated with private
everyday life.5 On the other hand, open fields receive no Fourth
Amendment protection because they do not provide settings for the
intimate activities the Amendment was intended to protect.56 Similarly,
people should expect less privacy at a location used for business
purposes when the government regulates this workspace or when people
share their workspace with coworkers or the public.
The Fourth Amendment allows for warrantless inspections of a
narrowly defined class of heavily regulated businesses, and therefore
people who work in these businesses should expect less privacy.57 For
example, in New York v. Burger,8 the Court held that a warrantless
inspection of Burger's junkyard by police was permissible because four
criteria were met: (1) the government regulated junkyards heavily, (2) a
substantial government interest supported this regulation, (3) a
warrantless inspection was necessary to further this regulatory scheme,
and (4) the statute's inspection plan advised Burger of possible searches
and limited the discretion of police. 9 If these four criteria are not met,
the Court has held that this warrant exception does not apply.'
People who do not have exclusive control over their workspace also
should expect decreased privacy rights. If a business is open to the
public, police do not need a warrant to enter and search any area the
public may enter.6 If a coworker has access to a person's workspace,
55. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212 (1986). The Court has also applied the use source
in other situations. For example, the Court grants Fourth Amendment protection for luggage because
people use luggage to transport their personal belongings. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753,
765 (1979); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977). Conversely, motor vehicles-even
motor homes--receive a lower level of Fourth Amendment protection because they are traditionally
used for transportation, not for shelter. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394 (1985).
56. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179. But see Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989), where the
plurality, while upholding an aerial search, noted that police did not observe any intimate details
during the search.
57. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691,702 (1987).
58. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
59. See id. at 702-03.
60. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307,324 (1978).
61. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463,469 (1985).
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that person cannot complain if the coworker consents to a police search.62
However, access by coworkers does not mean police can search private
areas absent consent,63 and this protection is not diminished even for
government employees.' Moreover, the cases where the Court has
applied these workplace rules all involved commercial premises, not
private homes being used for business purposes. 5
3. Societal Understandings
The Court has also looked to the concept of societal understandings as
a source of Fourth Amendment protection.' Thus, it has announced that
society understands that the home,67 the curtilage around the home,6 and
the workplace69 are places deserving Fourth Amendment protection. The
Court has explained how it determined societal understandings in only
two cases.
In United States v. Jacobsen," the Court concluded that because
Congress made certain drugs illegal, society understands that people
have no expectation of privacy in the possession of illegal drugs.7 The
62. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369-70 (1968). In fact, police could probably conduct
a lawful search without a warrant if they receive consent from a coworker whom police
reasonably believe has authority over a workspace. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188
(1990) (holding police may conduct search with consent from someone police reasonably think
has authority to consent).
63. See DeForte, 392 U.S. at 369-70.
64. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987). In O'Connor, the Court ruled that if
Ortega's governmental employer had a legitimate, work-related reason for searching Ortega's office,
then the search did not violate Ortega's Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 726. The Court
expressly distinguished work-related searches from searches conducted during criminal
investigations. See id. at 716-17.
65. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (junkyard); O'Connor, 480 U.S. 709
(government office); Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (store); Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (electrical and
plumbing installation business); DeForte, 392 U.S. 364 (union office).
66. This source is distinct from the broader question of what expectations of privacy society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable.
67. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984). But see supra notes 56-65 and
accompanying text.
68. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178-79; cf United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987).
69. See, e.g., O'Connor, 480 U.S. at 716; Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236
(1986); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178 n.8.
70. 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
71. See id. at 123.
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Court did not create a per se rule that laws always equate with societal
understandings, but it also did not explain when laws would.72
In Minnesota v. Olson,73 the Court looked to social customs to
determine societal understandings.74 The Court held that because staying
overnight at a friend's home is a deeply rooted social custom and because
society expects hosts to respect their guests' privacy, society understands
that overnight guests may reasonably expect privacy." The Court did not
explain whose social customs reflect societal understandings.
4. The Framers 'Intent
The Court has also evaluated the Framers' intent when determining
Fourth Amendment protections outside the home.76 To determine the
Framers' intent, the Court has looked to statements made when the
Amendment was adopted77 the practices of the English colonial
government that inspired the American Revolution,78 and contemporaneous
common-law opinions and treatises. 9 For example, in United States v.
Chadwick,0 the Court noted that the commands of the Fourth Amendment
grew out of the colonists' rejection of the English writs of assistance that
allowed English soldiers broad discretion to search for smuggled goods
inside and outside the home." Therefore, the Court held that police needed
a warrant to search Chadwick's footlocker, even though they seized it from
him in front of a train station rather than from his home.8 2 The Court has
also relied on the Framers' intent to find that people have reasonable
expectations of privacy at the workplace 3 and in private offices."
72. See, e.g., Dow, 476 U.S. at 232 (holding that "[s]tate tort law does not define the limits of the
Fourth Amendment"); Oliver, 460 U.S. at 183-84.
73. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
74. See id at 99-100.
75. See id.
76. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153 (1978) (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,
7-9 (1977)).
77. See, e.g., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176-77 (1984).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1977).
79. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,590-97 (1980).
80. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
81. Seeid. at 7-8.
82. See id. at 15-16.
83. See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978). But see supra notes 56-65 and
accompanying text.
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5. Precautions to Ensure Privacy
The last Rakas source the Court has considered when determining the
scope of Fourth Amendment protection is the precautions people take to
ensure privacy. When people outside the home take affirmative precautions
to ensure their privacy, the Court will consider these precautions when
evaluating their expectations of privacy." However, if people leave
something in plain view-even inside the home-they should not expect
that item to remain private.86 Additionally, when they share their privacy
with another person, they assume the risk that the person will compromise
that privacy to the police.87
In Katz v. United States,88 Justice Harlan found Katz's precautions
"critical" when concluding that police had violated Katz's Fourth Amend-
ment rights.89 Police had recorded Katz's conversation in a public phone
booth from which he was transmitting wagering information.9" Because he
had shut the phone booth door and paid the toll, Justice Harlan found that
Katz was entitled to assume that no one would intercept his calls.9
While adequate precautions can create privacy, the Court has also
used people's lack of sufficient precautions to find that people should not
reasonably expect privacy. Two related doctrines encompass the Court's
opinions in this area: plain view and assumption of risk.
a. Plain View
The Katz Court, while not the first to employ the plain-view doctrine,
clearly stated the doctrine's underlying premise that "[w]hat a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection."9 2 The Court has taken an
expansive approach to the plain-view doctrine, stating that people must
84. See G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 355 (1977).
85. See Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 6-9.
86. See infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
87. See infra notes 102-30 and accompanying text.
88. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
89. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Court developed the Katz test from Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion.
90. See id. at 348.
91. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The majority also found Katz's precaution gave him a
reasonable expectation of privacy. See id. at 353.
92. Id. at 351.
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take precautions to keep items out of view from any area the public could
reasonably be expected to travel.93 Thus, in California v. Ciraolo,94 the
Court acknowledged that a gardener who erected a six-foot-tall outer
fence and a ten-foot-tall inner fence around his house had a reasonable
expectation that no one at street level would see the "unlawful
agricultural pursuits" in his backyard.9' Nevertheless, the Court held that
police had not violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they flew an
airplane over his property and observed marijuana plants.96 The gardener
should not have expected privacy because "[a]ny member of the public
flying in [public] airspace who glanced down could have seen everything
that these officers observed.,
97
The plain-view doctrine also applies to items police find when
conducting a lawful search. 98 During a lawful search, police may seize
evidence discovered in plain view, even if the item seized is not listed on
the search warrant.' However, the incriminating character of an item not
listed in a warrant must be immediately apparent.' 0 If police see an
unlisted item in plain view and merely have a hunch that it is contraband,
they must get a new warrant covering the suspicious item before they can
inspect or seize it 1°
b. Assumption ofRisk
"[W]hen an individual reveals private information to another, he
assumes the risk that his confidant will reveal that information to the
authorities, and if that occurs the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
governmental use of that information."'0 2 Such information is analogous
93. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449-50 (1989). A majority of the Court rejected an even
more expansive test that would have held that items were in plain view if police could see items
while standing in a place they could legally be. See id at 454 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 465
(Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting).
94. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
95. Il at211.
96. See id.at215.
97. Id at 213-14. See also Riley, 488 U.S. at 451, where the plurality found that a homeowner did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his greenhouse because police could see into it
though a large gap in the greenhouse roof when they flew over the greenhouse in a helicopter.
98. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135 (1990).
99. See id at 135, 141.
100. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321,325 (1987).
101. See id.
102. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 117 (1984).
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to evidence in plain view, and any claim to privacy is forfeited." 3 There
are three ways people assume the risk of diminishing their privacy rights
when they share their privacy with another person: permitting joint
access to another person, 1°4 temporarily entrusting items to another
person,105 or permanently entrusting items to another person."'
Joint access limits people's expectations of privacy because they assume
the risk that the other person may expose their secrets to the government" 7
or give the government access to a private area. 8 However, the mere fact
that people permit another person joint access does not mean they have
"thrown open [private] areas.., to the warrantless scrutiny of Government
agents."'" The other person must voluntarily cooperate with the
government."' Therefore, in Mancusi v. DeForte,"' the Court held that
because DeForte shared a large union office with several other union
members, he had no Fourth Amendment claim if another union member
looked through his papers or consented to a police search."2 Nevertheless,
this joint access did not mean that police could conduct a warrantless
search without the consent of DeForte's officemates." 3
People's expectations of privacy change when they temporarily
entrust items to another person. Case law has established that police may
not open a sealed package or container without a warrant,' 14 but when
people entrust a package to another person, they assume the risk that the
other person may open the package and report its contents to the
government." 5 Once this other person has reported the package's
contents, these contents are like items in plain view and the owner has
103. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771-72 (1983).
104. See infra notes 107-13 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 114-22 and accompanying text.
106. See infra notes 124-29 and accompanying text.
107. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971).
108. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181 (1990).
109. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978).
110. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716 n.4 (1984).
111. 392 U.S. 364 (1968).
112. See id. at 369-70.
113. See id.
114. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120 n.17 (1984).
115. See id. at 117.
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lost any expectation of privacy." 6 However, police may not influence the
other person's original decision to open the-package." 7
Although the Fourth Amendment protects all sorts of packages from
police searches, regardless of the method of packaging,"' people who turn
unpackaged items over to another person should not expect any privacy in
those items." 9 In Rawlings v. Kentucky, '2 Rawlings placed a large volume
of unpackaged drugs in an acquaintance's purse moments before police
detained them and illegally searched the purse.'' The Court held that
Rawlings should not have expected privacy in the purse because by simply
stashing his drugs in the purse without doing more, Rawlings had not taken
even "normal precautions to maintain his privacy.""
Finally, people should not expect privacy in items they give to another
person, even if that other person promises to keep the items secret.1 3 For
example, in United States v. Payner,24 the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) hired a private investigator to help it gain access to papers in a
bank official's briefcase, including papers that led to evidence eventually
used at trial against Payner.'" This investigator enlisted a female
associate who cultivated a relationship with the bank official and tricked
him into leaving his briefcase at her apartment while they went to
dinner.26 During this dinner, the investigator entered the apartment, took
the briefcase to an IRS-recommended locksmith to open it, and then
allowed an IRS agent to photograph all of the papers in the briefcase.'27
The investigator then returned the briefcase to the apartment. 28 The U.S.
116. See id.; Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983).
117. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115 & n.10.
118. See Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420 (1981) (holding marijuana wrapped in green plastic
was sufficiently packaged to warrant Fourth Amendment protection), overruled on other grounds,
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
119. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1980).
120. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
121. See id. at 100-01.
122. Id at 105-06.
123. See United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980); see also United States v. Miller, 425
U.S. 435 (1976) (holding bank depositor had no Fourth Amendment protection in bank records,
despite bank privacy laws, because depositor had voluntarily given this information to bank).
124. 447 U.S. 727 (1980).
125. See id at 730.
126. See id. at 738-40 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
127. See id. at 740-41 (Marshall, L, dissenting).
128. See id. at 741 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court ruled that the evidence discovered on account of these
stolen papers should not have been excluded from Payner's trial because
the papers did not belong to Payner and the IRS had obtained the
evidence without violating Payner's Fourth Amendment rights.
12 9
In 1972, Justice Douglas wrote that the Fourth Amendment and its
warrant clause served as "a barrier against intrusions by officialdom into
the privacies of life."'30 A quarter of a century later, when the Court
decided Minnesota v. Carter, the Rakas sources defined the strength of
this barrier outside of the home.
II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS OF THE RAKAS SOURCES IN
MINNESOTA v. CARTER
A. The Facts
On May 15, 1994, an informant told Officer Jim Thielen that he had just
observed through a ground-floor apartment window some people bagging
drugs.' The informant pointed at the window and told the officer what type
of car the people bagging the drugs drove.'32 Officer Thielen then walked to
within a foot of the window and peered through the drawn venetian
blinds.'33 To get to this window, the officer had to walk behind some bushes
to an area where people at the apartment stored their bicycles.'34 Through a
gap in the blinds, Officer Thielen observed three people bagging a white
powdery substance.'35 These three people were later identified as Wayne
Carter, Melvin Johns, and Kimberly Thompson.'36
When Carter and Johns drove away from the apartment two-and-a-
half hours later, police relied on Officer Thielen's observations as
probable cause to stop the car.'37 In the car, police found forty-seven
grams of cocaine. 3 ' Police eventually learned that Carter and Johns were
129. See id. at 735.
130. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 332 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
131. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 103 (1998) (Breyer, J., concurring).
132. See id.; State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169, 172 (Minn. 1997), rev'd, 525 U.S. 83.
133. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 103 (Breyer, J., concurring).
134. See id. (Breyer, J., concurring); Carter, 569 N.W.2d at 172.
135. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 103 (Breyer, J., concurring).
136. See id. at 86.
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from another state and had paid Thompson one-eighth of an ounce of
cocaine to use her apartment to package their cocaine.'39
After a two-day pretrial suppression hearing, the trial court ruled that
Carter and Johns did not have standing"4° to object to Officer Thielen's
"search" through the window. 14' The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court's ruling, but the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed. 42 in
1998, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari. 43
B. The Carter Majority Used Three Rakas Sources to Develop a Test to
Determine Reasonable Expectations ofPrivacy Outside the Home
In Carter, the Court used three Rakas sources-property interests,
societal understandings, and use of the location-to create a multi-factor
balancing test for determining reasonable expectations of privacy outside
the home.'" Applying this test, the Court held that Carter and Johns had
no reasonable expectation of privacy because they were short-term
business guests.
45
The Court first determined that under the property-interest source,
people do not have reasonable expectations of privacy simply because
they are in "a home" because "the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places."'" Instead, some other source must provide a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the place invaded. 47 The Court then used the
societal-understandings source to set out two situations where people's
expectations of privacy were clear. 148 In one situation, people legitimately
on the premises but with no other connection to the premises should not
139. See id at 86.
140. Although the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Rakas that courts should not use the doctrine of
standing at suppression hearings, see supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text, other courts
routinely invoke the term. See, e.g., People v. Cartwright, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 788, 793 n.8 (1999)
(noting that "the term [standing] has demonstrated a vampiric persistence" and the U.S. Supreme
Court has been unable to "drive a stake through its heart").
141. See State v. Carter, 569 N.W.2d 169, 173 (Minn. 1997), rev'd, 525 U.S. 83.
142. See U
143. See Minnesota v. Carter, 523 U.S. 1003 (1998) (mem.).
144. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 87-91.
145. See id at 91.
146. Id. at 88 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,351 (1967)).
147. See id. (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S.
98, 106 (1980)).
148. See iU at 89-90.
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reasonably expect privacy. 49  In another situation, overnight guests
should reasonably expect privacy. 5' The Court then developed three
factors for courts to use to evaluate guests' expectations when guests
have some connection to the premises but are not staying the night.'51
First, courts should consider how guests are using the premises.'52
Business uses create a lesser expectation of privacy than personal uses.'53
Next, courts should consider how long the guests have been on the
premises. 5 4 In Carter, two-and-a-half hours was too short to grant any
protection for Carter and Johns.'55 Finally, courts should consider the
relationship between the host and the guests asserting Fourth
Amendment protection.'56 Some previous connection between the guest
and host must exist.'57 Under this test, the Court concluded that Carter
and Johns had no reasonable expectation of privacy in Thompson's
apartment because there was no evidence that they were regular visitors,
they had only been at the apartment for two-and-a-half hours, and they
were using the apartment "simply [as] a place to do business."'58
Therefore, the Court held it did not need to inquire whether Officer
Thielen's search was legal. 59
C. The Three Concurrences Also Used the Rakas Sources
Three Justices wrote concurrences in Carter and also relied on the
Rakas sources in reaching their conclusions. Justice Kennedy applied the
societal-understandings source to determine that social guests, but not
short-term business guests, should reasonably expect privacy."' Carter
149. See id. (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 259 (1960), as limited by Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978)).
150. See id. at 89 (citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98 (1990)).
151. See id. at 90.
152. See id. at 90-91.
153. See id. (citing New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987)).
154. See id. (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 490 U.S. 709, 716-17 (1987)).
155. See id. at91.




160. See id. at 99, 102 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy also joined the majority's
opinion. However, as noted by the dissent, which also applied the societal-understandings source, a
majority of the Court found that almost all social guests would have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in a host's home. See id. at 109 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). While some courts applying
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and Johns should not have reasonably expected privacy because they
were business guests using the apartment as a temporary processing
station, and there was no evidence that they engaged in confidential
communications with Thompson. 6' Justice Scalia reasoned that the
Framers did not intend the Fourth Amendment's protection to extend to
guests not staying overnight." To discern this intent, Justice Scalia
looked to several state constitutions written before the Bill of Rights,
common-law treatises, and common-law cases, including Semayne's
Case.63 Based on these sources, he determined that the Amendment's
protection for "their... houses" meant "their respective houses" and
therefore did not cover casual guests.'" Justice Breyer argued that Carter
and Johns had taken insufficient precautions to ensure their privacy.1 65
He therefore concurred with the majority's result, even though he agreed
with the dissent's reasoning.'6 Relying on Florida v. Riley,67 Justice
Breyer reasoned that because other residents of the apartment complex
stored bicycles in the area immediately in front of the window through
which Officer Thielen looked, Thielen made his observations from an
area regularly traveled by members of the public. 168 Therefore, "[t]he
precautions that the apartment's dwellers took to maintain their privacy
would have failed in respect to an ordinary passerby standing in that
place [where Officer Thielen stood]."'69  The Justices' selective
Carter have recognized that social guests have a reasonable expectation of privacy, see, e.g., Morton
v. United States, 734 A.2d 178, 181 (D.C. 1999), other courts applying Carter have held that neither
social nor business guests can expect privacy in others' homes. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-
Lopez, No. 98-10075, 1999 WL 109632 (9th Cir. Feb. 26, 1999) (unpublished opinion).
161. See id. at 102 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Presumably, Thompson, Carter, and Johns wanted
to keep their activities secret, and it can easily be inferred that they spoke about their activities while
in the apartment. Justice Kennedy did not cite any facts that suggest otherwise.
162. See id. at 97 (Scalia, J., concurring). Although Justice Scalia joined the majority's opinion,
he described the Katz test as a "self-indulgent test" that had no foundation in the plain language of
the Fourth Amendment. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Because the Rakas sources are used to apply the
Katz test, Justice Scalia was not applying a Rakas source. Nevertheless, his analysis of the Framers'
intent is identical to the analysis courts would use to apply the Framers' intent as a Rakas source.
163. See id. at 92-96 (Scalia, J., concurring).
164. Id at 92 (Scalia, J., concurring).
165. See id at 104 (Breyer, J., concurring).
166. See id. at 103 (Breyer, J., concurring). The dissent argued society understands that all guests
who engage in common endeavors with their hosts should reasonably expect privacy. See id. at 107-
11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
167. 488 U.S. 445 (1989); see also supra note 93.
168. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 104 (Breyer, J., concurring).
169. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring).
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application of the Rakas sources and their use of subjective information
in those applications in the various Carter opinions highlight the
problems with the Rakas sources.
III. THE COURT SHOULD FORMULATE A TEST THAT RELIES
ON OBJECTIVE INFORMATION
The Court should abandon the Rakas sources and the test developed in
Carter because neither protects Fourth Amendment rights. The Rakas
sources may have assisted the Court in determining the scope of Carter's
and Johns' Fourth Amendment rights after a two-day suppression hearing,
but these sources do not provide guidance to police or citizens, and therefore
fail to serve the Amendment's broader purpose of protecting people's right
to remain free from government intrusion or surveillance.
Several of the sources do not provide guidance to police or citizens.
Police about to conduct a search do not have access to the information
they need to apply the complex analyses some of these sources require.
Likewise, the Rakas sources provide no guidance to citizens because
several of the sources do not rely on information citizens would equate
with privacy. Although some of the sources provide guidance in some
situations, police and citizens have no way of knowing which of the
sources a court will apply and therefore cannot rely on any one source.
Carter exemplifies the problem with the Rakas sources. By selectively
applying the sources, the Carter Court was able to change substantially
its analysis of two Rakas sources (property interest and use) and
completely ignore a third (precautions to ensure privacy). The test the
Court then developed with the Rakas sources is highly complicated and
neither police nor citizens will be able to apply it.
The Rakas sources and presumably the Carter test are designed for
courts to use at suppression hearings. 7 ' However, the Court itself has
recognized that police and citizens need to know the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection before a search occurs. 7' By the time of a
suppression hearing, police have already invaded someone's privacy and
if that invasion was not sanctioned by the Fourth Amendment, the
Amendment's goal of protecting people from unwarranted government
surveillance and intrusion has failed. The Court should therefore
discontinue use of the Rakas sources, abandon the Carter test, and
170. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133 (1978).
171. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
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instead develop a test that police can apply with information they have in
the field and that relies on information citizens equate with privacy.
A. The Rakas Sources Fail to Provide Meaningful Guidance to Police
or Citizens
Taken as a whole, the Rakas sources fail to provide guidance to either
police or citizens and therefore fail to protect Fourth Amendment rights.
Police cannot properly utilize the property interest source unless they know
ahead of time what property interests people have in a location. Thus,
when police pulled over the car in Rakas,72 they had no way of knowing
that Rakas did not own the car. Moreover, the owner of the car was
driving,"n and obviously this search may have invaded her privacy as well.
How a place is used by a person cannot provide guidance to police or
citizens when courts consider actual use rather than intended use. Police
can often discern the way a location should be used before they conduct
a search. Likewise, citizens should know that certain areas, because of
how they are traditionally used, would not provide privacy. For example,
the Supreme Court cases concerning searches of businesses involved
commercial premises 74 that by their nature should have alerted police
and citizens that privacy expectations should be lower. However, when
the Court considers people's actual use of a location, this source is
significantly less helpful because police will rarely know how a person is
actually using an enclosed location. 75
The societal-understandings source provides no guidance to police or
citizens because it is unclear what this source really is. As noted above,' 76
the Court has not defined what this term means, when it will be defined by
laws, or whose social customs it encompasses. Without such definition, the
Court can manipulate the source to mean whatever the Court desires.
Defining the scope of Fourth Amendment protection by looking to the
Framers' intent dramatically threatens privacy because this "intent" is
172. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 130.
173. See id.
174. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
175. For example, in Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 452 (1989), when upholding police's aerial
search of Riley's greenhouse, the plurality noted that police did not observe any intimate details
associated with the home during this search. The dissent wondered whether the Court's opinion
would have changed if police had observed Riley and his wife in an intimate embrace. See id. at 463
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Police could not predict such an intimate encounter.
176. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
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unknowable and inherently malleable. Even documents like the
Federalist Papers are the words of only three men, not the entire nation.
Moreover, there is little chance anyone besides lawyers and historians
have any guess as to what the Framers thought. Certainly, police and
citizens are not considering such ideas when they consider whether
someone should or should not expect privacy.
Unlike the other four Rakas sources, police and citizens can gauge
what precautions should ensure privacy without the aid of a suppression
hearing. However, this source still fails to protect privacy because there
is no guarantee the Court will apply this source. The Court has not
applied all five Rakas sources in every case; rather, the Court has applied
only those sources that served its purpose. Thus, even if the precautions
source could provide guidance in a particular situation, the Court may
well choose to ignore that source. Even some of the other sources, such
as the use source, or even the property-interest source, could potentially
provide guidance to police and citizens in some situations if there were
any guarantee the Court would apply them. However, police and citizens
will never know if the Court will choose to ignore any particular source.
Thus, when the criminal defendant in Oliver v. United States' built a
fence, put up a no-trespassing sign, and posted a guard to protect his
marijuana crop on land he owned, he expected privacy.'78 His
precautions on the land he owned, however, failed to give him Fourth
Amendment protection because the Court opted not to apply the
property-interest or precautions sources.'79 It relied instead on three other
Rakas sources: the way a location is used, societal understandings, and
the Framer's intent. 18 These sources all suggested that Oliver did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his marijuana field.18' Oliver
illustrates how the Court's selective application of the Rakas sources
prevents any of the sources from providing guidance.
Police and citizens need to know the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection before police conduct a search. The Rakas sources cannot
fulfill this need because several of the Rakas sources rely on information
that will become available only at a suppression hearing and because
police and citizens cannot know which sources a court will apply.
177. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
178. See id. at 173.
179. See id. at 182-84.
180. See id. at 178.
181. See id. at 177-81.
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Therefore, courts should not use the Rakas sources to define the scope of
Fourth Amendment protection.
B. The Holding in Carter Exemplifies the Problems with the Rakas
Sources
The shortcomings of the Carter case are threefold. First, the Court
substantially changed the application of two Rakas sources, property
interest and use, and ignored a third, precautions to ensure privacy.
Second, the Court's application of two other sources-societal
understandings and Framers' intent-highlights and amplifies the
problems with those sources. Finally, the Court's new test relies almost
exclusively on information police cannot know until after a search has
occurred, which is too late to protect citizens' privacy.
1. The Carter Court Redefined the Property-Interest Source
The Carter Court redefined the property-interest source by misapplying
the Court's prior decisions and ignoring Carter and Johns' property interest
in Thompson's apartment Carter will make it even more difficult for
police about to conduct a search because they must now determine not only
if a person has a property interest in a premises, but also whether that
property interest is sufficient to create reasonable expectations of privacy
before police can determine if they need a warrant.
First, the Carter Court disregarded the true meaning of Katz's famous
phrase, "the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,"' 82 by
holding that this phrase means the Fourth Amendment does not protect
people simply because they are in someone's home."' This conclusion
does not follow from Katz, where the Court held that people could expect
privacy outside of their own homes, even in a public phone booth,
simply by taking adequate precautions.'1 4 If the Carter Court had given
this phrase its true meaning, it would have looked at the precautions
Carter and Johns took, rather than focusing solely on the fact that Carter
and Johns did not live at Thompson's apartment.
182. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,351 (1967).
183. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998). But see Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91,
96 & n.5 (1990) (using this quote from Katz to reject Minnesota's position as being based on "the
mistaken premise that a place must be one's 'home' in order for one to have a legitimate expectation
of privacy").
184. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (shutting door and paying toll were adequate precautions).
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Second, the Court misapplied the holdings of Rakas v. Illinois' and
Rawlings v. Kentucky."8 6 In those cases, once the Court had determined
that Rakas and Rawlings did not have property interests in the areas
searched, the Court held that Rakas and Rawlings should not have
reasonably expected privacy because they took inadequate precautions." 7
The Carter Court ignored this second step; once it found that Carter and
Johns were not staying overnight at Thompson's apartment, it ended its
analysis.' 88 The Court never even addressed the fact that Carter and Johns
had temporarily rented Thompson's apartment.'89 This selective reasoning
is irreconcilable with the Court's analyses in Rakas and Rawlings.
In Rakas, the Court explained why Rakas had no privacy expectation
in the invaded place by comparing Rakas to house guests it discussed in
two hypotheticals.' 9 In the first hypothetical, the Court noted that a
casual guest in a host's kitchen who had never visited the basement
should not expect privacy in the basement.'9 ' A second hypothetical
guest who had just walked into a home should not expect privacy
anywhere in the house.'92 The first hypothetical house guest had not
taken precautions to ensure his privacy in the basement and the second
had not taken precautions to ensure his privacy anywhere in the house.'
93
These two hypotheticals imply that the first guest could reasonably
expect privacy in the kitchen. Carter and Johns closely resemble this first
guest because they were at Thompson's apartment for over two hours
and, ironically, were bagging cocaine in her kitchen.'94 The Carter Court
simply ignored the role the hypotheticals played in Rakas.
185. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
186. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
187. See infra notes 189-96 and accompanying text.
188. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 90.
189. They had paid Thompson one-eighth of an ounce of cocaine to use her apartment. See id. at
86. This amount of cocaine would have a street value of over $100. See Interview with Daniel
Kinnicutt, Deputy Prosecutor with the Pierce County Prosecuting Attorney's Office Drug Unit, in
Tacoma, Wash. (May 1999).
190. See Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-49. Because Rakas was riding in a getaway car from a bank
robbery, which is a criminal enterprise, the "guests" the Court refers to in Rakas must be business
guests.
191. See id. at 142.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 142, 149-50 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)).
194. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 104 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Vol. 75:281, 2000
Privacy Outside One's Own Home
In Rawlings, just as in Rakas, the key factor was Rawlings' failure to
take adequate precautions to protect his drugs from detection rather than
his lack of ownership in the purse in which he stored those drugs. 95 The
Court ruled that Rawlings could not have reasonably expected his drugs
to remain private when he stored them in an acquaintance's purse,
especially because he had no right to exclude others from that purse.'96
Unlike Rawlings, Carter and Johns never abandoned their drugs, and
they took the precautions of locking the door and shutting the blinds,
albeit not very effectively.
The Carter Court's manipulation of these three cases to define how
property interests give people reasonable expectations of privacy
exemplifies why the Court should not rely on the property-interest
source. First, the Court relied heavily on the fact that Carter and Johns
were only short-term business guests, but Officer Thielen could not have
known that two of the people he would see through Thompson's window
did not live at the apartment, were not social guests, or were not planning
to spend the night. Second, because the Court ignored the fact that Carter
and Johns had a property interest in the apartment, 9 7 the opinion
suggests that certain property interests do not warrant protection but does
not define what these inferior property interests are.'98 Finally, by
ignoring its evaluations of the precautions-to-ensure-privacy source in
Katz, Rakas, and Rawlings, the Carter Court implied that those
precautions are irrelevant. These precautions, however, often provide the
only objectively perceivable information police have about the privacy
expectations of people inside a structure.
2. The Carter Court Redefined the Use Source by Considering
Carter's and Johns'Actual Use of Thompson's Apartment
Carter holds that people using any premises for business purposes
should not expect any privacy if they do not have a significant
195. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980).
196. See id
197. See supra note 189.
198. See, eg., United States v. Gordon, 168 F.3d 1222, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 1999) (applying
Carter and holding Gordon did not have reasonable expectation of privacy in motel room for which
he had paid and possessed key because room was not registered under his name, he had been in
room for only few minutes before police entered, and he was using room for business purposes-
selling drugs).
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connection to that premises.' The consideration of actual use will
prevent police from properly applying this source because if the premises
is not a commercial space,2" police will have no readily available means
of learning how people are using it.
For the Carter Court to reach its conclusion, it had to manipulate the
holdings in New York v. Burger2° 1 and O'Connor v. Ortega."2 The Court
interprets Burger's statement that "[a]n expectation of privacy in
commercial premises, however, is different from, and indeed less than, a
similar expectation in an individual's home,"2 3 to mean expectations are
lower anytime people are using any location, even a home, for business
purposes.2" This literal interpretation ignores the context in which the
Court made the original statement. In Burger, the Court allowed a
warrantless inspection of Burger's junkyard only because the junkyard
qualified as a heavily regulated business and a statute permitted
warrantless searches." 5 The lower expectations of privacy in the
commercial setting mentioned in Burger most likely reflect that society
would never accept a statute allowing warrantless searches of the home
but would accept such a statute governing commercial spaces.206
Moreover, without such a statute in place, the Court has not permitted
warrantless searches of private workspaces." 7 The holding in Carter
conflicts with Burger because Carter allows searches of workplaces
without a warrant, without a statute, and without probable cause.
The Carter Court also should not have applied O'Connor v. Ortega2"8
because O'Connor is inapposite to Carter. O'Connor involved a search
by an employer, which the Court held would be permissible only if the
search was conducted for work-related purposes.2 9 The O'Connor Court
199. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 91.
200. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
201. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
202. 480 U.S. 709 (1987). See supra note 64 for a discussion of this case.
203. Burger, 482 U.S. at 700.
204. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 90.
205. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
206. Citizens would not allow the government to pass a statute that would permit warrantless
searches of any location. See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978) (holding
warrantless searches under OSHA are impermissible because such searches are not necessary to
further OSHA regulation, and therefore heavily-regulated-business exception does not apply).
207. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
208. 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
209. See id. at 712-14, 716-17.
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expressly distinguished an employer's work-related search from a search
by police conducting a criminal investigation." ° Because police
conducted the search in Carter as part of a criminal investigation, the
holding in O'Connor should not apply. By applying the holding of
O'Connor to a criminal search, the Court greatly expanded the situations
where police may conduct a warrantless workplace search.
After Carter, police cannot rely on the distinction between commercial
and noncommercial premises and must determine whether the worker has a
"significant" connection before they conduct a search.2 ' This ruling creates
uncertainty in the law and does not follow from the Court's past decisions.
3. The Court's Use of Societal Understandings and Framers'Intent
Demonstrates Why the Court Should Not Rely on These Sources
The Carter Court's analysis of societal understandings and Framers'
intent demonstrates why neither police nor citizens can rely on these
sources when trying to determine the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection. The societal-understandings source relies on information police
will not know before they conduct a search. The Carter majority,
interpreting Minnesota v. Olson,... held that society understands that
overnight guests have reasonable expectations of privacy only because
these guests are vulnerable when they sleep." 3 For police to apply this
holding, they will have to know whether a guest is intending to stay the
night.214
Justice Kennedy's concurrence further demonstrates that the societal-
understandings source provides no guidance to police because his
210. See id. The Fourth Amendment was at issue because the employer was the government and
the employee filed a civil suit. See id at 712-14.
211. See, e.g., United States v. Marcias-Treviso, 42 F. Supp. 2d 1206, 1212-14 (D.N.M. 1999)
(applying Carter and holding Marcias-Treviso did not have reasonable expectation of privacy in
garage he rented from his brother because he had not slept in garage and was using it for business
purposes-fixing cars).
212. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
213. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83,90 & n.* (1998).
214. See id at 107-09 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that staying overnight should not be
deciding factor); see also Taylor v. State, 995 S.W.2d 279, 280, 282 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)
(holding Taylor did not have reasonable expectation of privacy at friend's house because, although
he was at this house from 11 p.m. to 6 a.m., he did not sleep so he was more like "a friend visiting
during the day" than an "overnight guest"); Stephen P. Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy:
Searches, Seizures, and the Concept of Fourth Amendment Standing, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 907, 964
(1997) (criticizing Olson because it requires police to determine whether guests intend to stay
overnight).
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opinion turns on Carter's and Johns' subjective intentions. Justice
Kennedy found that society understands that almost all social guests
should reasonably expect privacy in a host's home."5 Carter and Johns,
however, should not have reasonably expected privacy because they
were at Thompson's apartment for short-term business purposes. 1 6
Under this analysis, guests' expectations of privacy depend on whether
they are visiting for business or pleasure. 7 It is unrealistic to expect
police to determine what people's motives for visiting are before
conducting a search, and it is unwise to develop a test that turns on such
subjective information.
The debate in Carter between Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy over
the Framers' intent emphasizes why the Court should also abandon this
source. As noted above, Justice Scalia found, based in part on Semayne's
Case, that the Framers did not intend to grant Fourth Amendment
protection to guests not spending the night.2"' Justice Kennedy
challenged this interpretation by asserting that the meaning of Semayne 's
Case was in dispute and by pointing out that the case was a civil case.219
Whatever Semayne's Case may mean, one thing is unquestionable:
neither police nor citizens are going to join this debate when trying to
determine the scope of Fourth Amendment protection. The Framers'
intent, like the vague concept of societal understandings, is not
something that ordinary people equate with privacy and therefore should
not be part of a Fourth Amendment test.
4. The Carter Court Abandoned the One Useful Rakas Source:
People's Precautions to Ensure Privacy
Prior to Carter, even in cases where the Court found that people had
no property interest in locations searched, the Court considered people's
215. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 99 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
216. See id. at 102 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
217. See, e.g., Morton v. United States, 734 A.2d 178 (D.C. 1999) (applying Carter, majority held
Morton had reasonable expectation of privacy at friend's home because of degree of acceptance in
home, while dissent argued Morton did not have reasonable expectation of privacy because he had
gone to friend's home to deposit drug profits).
218. See Carter, 525 U.S. at 92-96 (Scalia, J., concurring).
219. See id. at 100-01 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also The Supreme Court, 1998 Term-
Leading Cases, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 200, 271-73 (1999) (criticizing Justice Scalia's Framers' intent
analysis as inconsistent with common law and as already rejected by the Court in Steagald).
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precautions to ensure privacy.' Without addressing Carter and Johns'
precautions to ensure privacy, the Carter Court ruled that it did not need
to determine if a search had occurred, even though Carter and Johns had
a property interest in Thompson's apartment." It is implicit in the
Court's decision not to address these precautions that Carter and Johns
could not have taken any precautions that would have given them a
reasonable expectation of privacy. By ignoring Carter and Johns'
property interest in Thompson's apartment, the Court created substantial
doubt as to whether business people renting space for a short period of
time can ever reasonably expect privacy. In essence, the Carter opinion
makes people's expectations of privacy in temporary workspaces similar
to privacy expectations in open fields.' It does not matter if people have
paid for privacy, taken all the precautions possible, and not shared their
privacy with anyone. They simply should not expect privacy. By
ignoring the precautions to ensure privacy taken in Carter, the Court
abandoned the one Rakas source that provided objective guidance to
police and citizens. The abandonment was particularly hasty because, as
demonstrated by Justice Breyer, the Court could have relied on Carter
and Johns' insufficient precautions to reach the same conclusion that
Carter and Johns should not have reasonably expected privacy.'
5. The Carter Test Fails to Protect Fourth Amendment Values Because
It Relies Almost Exclusively on Information Police Cannot Gain
Before They Conduct a Search
Justice Rehnquist's test in Carter creates great uncertainty as to
whether the Fourth Amendment will protect people from police intrusion
outside the home. An insightful critique of a similar test can be found in
Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion in Steagald v. United States,224
where he wrote:
The genuinely unfortunate aspect of [the majority's holding] ... is
the increased uncertainty imposed on police officers in the
field.., who must confront variations and permutations of this
factual situation on a day to day basis. They will.., have to weigh
220. See supra notes 184-99 and accompanying text.
221. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 51, 56, and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
224. 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
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the time during which a suspect ... has been in the building,
whether the dwelling is the suspect's home, how long he has lived
there, whether he is likely to leave immediately and a number of
equally imponderable questions. Certainty and repose, as Justice
Holmes said, may not be the destiny of man, but one might have
hoped for a higher degree of certainty in this one narrow but
important area of the law than is offered by [the majority's]
decision.2 5
Rather than create certainty and repose, Justice Rehnquist's holding in
Carter does the exact opposite. The Carter test turns on the time during
which suspects have been in the building, whether it is their home, and a
number of equally imponderable questions such as how the suspect is
using the building and what the suspect's relationship is with the host. 2
6
Officer Thielen knew none of this information before he looked through
Thompson's window, and after he looked, the apartment dwellers'
privacy was already invaded.
B. The Proposed Test: Precautions to Ensure Privacy and the
Reasonable Person's Evaluation of Those Precautions
Rather than relying on information that is first learned at a suppression
hearing, courts should use a two-prong test that police and citizens can
apply before a search occurs. Courts should first look at what precautions
people have taken to ensure their privacy and then grant Fourth
Amendment protection if the reasonable person would find that those
precautions should have ensured privacy. Because this test relies on
objective information, police and citizens will be able to apply the test as
easily as the courts.
While this proposed test sounds similar to the two-part Katz test,227 the
proposed test is more directed and therefore will result in more uniform
application. The first prong of the Katz test required a person to have a
subjective expectation of privacy. The usefulness of this prong was
limited because people challenging searches could always say they
expected privacy. The first prong of the proposed test requires people to
demonstrate their expectations by taking precautions to prove they
expected privacy. These precautions are objective facts that people and
225. Id. at 231 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
226. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 90-91 (1998).
227. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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police can evaluate not only in court, but more importantly before a
search occurs. This first prong encompasses the plain view doctrine. 8
The second prong of the proposed test makes a subtle, but
fundamental, change from the second prong of the Katz test. By asking
whether the reasonable person would expect people's precautions to
ensure privacy actually to protect their privacy, the proposed test avoids
the Katz test's vague concept of "expectation of privacy... society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable." 9 The Court could always find that
society did not recognize an expectation of privacy as reasonable, but the
Court will not so easily be able to say that the reasonable person thought
someone's precautions should have failed. Moreover, a reasonable
person would never think someone's precautions should have failed
because of a 400-year-old case or because society does not value a
particular relationship or custom.
This reasonable-person requirement makes the test more than a plain-
view test because there are certain situations where the reasonable person
would not think people could take adequate precautions to ensure privacy.
This test would adopt the rules the Court has developed for searches of
commercial premises20 and the assumption-of-risk doctrine"' because the
reasonable person would expect that the more people share their privacy
with others, the less privacy they should expect
The proposed test will better protect the goals of the Fourth
Amendment because it provides clear guidance to citizens and police. All
people need to do is put themselves in the shoes of the reasonable person
and evaluate the precautions that have been taken. This analysis relies
entirely on objective information that is immediately available outside of
the courtroom. For example, in Carter, the reasonable person would not
have expected the apartment dwellers' precautions to have ensured
privacy because Officer Thielen made his observations from an area
frequented by the public.
228. See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
229. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (internal quotation
omitted).
230. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 102-29 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
Commentators first viewed the Katz decision as a potentially broad
expansion of people's right to privacy.232 One commentator went as far
as to argue, "The question is not whether you or I must draw the blinds
before we commit a crime. It is whether you and I must discipline
ourselves to draw the blinds every time we enter a room, under pain of
surveillance if we do not." '233 Although that commentator's answer was a
resounding no,234 the Court's use of the Rakas sources to apply Katz has
ensured that Katz did not provide a sweeping increase in privacy
rights.235 So long as acts remain illegal even when people carry them out
in private homes, police must be able to investigate those acts. If the
Fourth Amendment is to protect people's privacy from police conducting
these investigations, people must do their part and draw the blinds when
they want privacy. Asking any less would give people Fourth Amendment
protection when they have not exhibited an actual expectation of privacy.
However, the Court's application of the Rakas sources to develop the
test in Carter goes too far. By refusing to address Carter and Johns'
precautions to ensure privacy, the Court abandoned the one source police
and citizens could objectively evaluate before a search occurs and before
someone's rights have been violated. Courts should instead apply a test
that evaluates these precautions and asks whether the reasonable person
would expect these precautions to ensure privacy. This would allow
people to know when the Fourth Amendment protects their privacy and
would allow police to carry out their duties without trampling on
innocent people's rights. The Court's holding in Carter provides no such
guidance to police and puts into serious question whether people should
ever expect privacy outside their homes.
232. See, e.g., The Supreme Court: 1967 Term, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 63, 190 (1968) (suggesting
Court's protection of phone booth will call for "re-examination of areas previously declared
'absolutely unprotected"').
233. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 403
(1974).
234. See id. at 404.
235. See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
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